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BABIES' BLOOD: FRAGMENTATION, REDEMPTION, AND
PHENYLKETONURIA
M. SUSAN LINDEE*

In a ten-year period, from 1955 to 1965, an obscure metabolic
disorder emerged from the medical ghetto of genetic disease to

become the biochemical center of a vast network of information,
technology, social management, and legislation.

Phenylketonuria

("PKU"), a rare disorder of phenylalanine metabolism, became the
focus of a major public health initiative. Present in approximately 1
in 15,000 American births, PKU attracted the funding and interest of

national organizations devoted to the control of mental retardation in
children. Dozens of scientific papers appeared documenting the
course and treatment of PKU; the U.S. Children's Bureau sponsored
a field trial of a new diagnostic test;' and by September 1965 thirtytwo state legislatures established neonatal PKU screening as public
health policy. Screening was mandatory in twenty-five of these
states.2 Thus in a short period, a rare genetic disease came to be
embedded in a dispersed system of medical and political

management.
Explanations of these events have appeared in retrospectives by
participants, in scientific reviews, and in scholarly studies by ethicists,
political scientists, and historians.3 Perhaps the simplest narrative
* Associate Professor, Department of History and Sociology of Science, University of
Pennsylvania. I owe special thanks to archivists Daniel Barbiero at the National Academy of
Sciences, Tab Lewis at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park,
Maryland, and Matt Fulgham at the National Archives and Records Administration I in
Washington, D.C. Marion Robertson, neither an archivist nor historian, thought it was important to
save old records and because she thought so, I was able to work with Maryland Department of
Health records that were "archived" in an unused cabinet in Baltimore. For their insights, I am
grateful to Robbie Aronowitz, Scott Gilbert, Barbara Kimmelman, Dorothy Nelkin and Diane Paul.
My research for this project has been funded by the Burroughs Wellcome Fund 40th Anniversary
Award.
1. For a description of the field trials, see ROBERT GUTHRIE & STEWART WHITNEY, U.S.
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. NO. 419, PHENYLKETONURIA DETECTION IN THE NEWBORN INFANT
AS A ROUTINE HOSPITAL PROCEDURE (1964) (on file with the U.S. Children's Bureau, National
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB.
No. 419].
2. On the status of neonatal testing in late 1965, see Letter from Rudolf P. Hormuth,
Specialist in Services for Mentally Retarded Children, U.S. Children's Bureau, to M. Beaudet,
M.D. (Dec. 6, 1965) (on file with the U.S. Children's Bureau, National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, D.C.).
3. For a perceptive overview of these events and their policy implications, see Diane B. Paul,
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portrays the rise of PKU screening as the strict consequence of
advancing knowledge.
Scientists began to understand how to
intervene in PKU, and this understanding mandated a legislative and

public health program.

PKU screening was therefore the natural
4

consequence of new knowledge.
A somewhat more complicated story appeared in a 1975 National
Academy of Sciences report prepared by a committee of the

American Society of Human Genetics. 5 In this account, PKU
screening programs derived not from knowledge but from ignorance,

'6
specifically "fragmented, uneducated and hurried decision-making.
State legislators, swayed by emotional pleas from parents of mentally
retarded children and by "unfounded claims" about the efficacy of a
low-phenylalanine diet, rapidly implemented a vast public health
system without considering the consequences. The report noted that

"[t]here was very little recognition of the implications for public
policy, or for the impact on individuals who were screened, of the fact
that PKU is a genetic disease."7
These narratives explaining how PKU became a public health
priority are compelling ways of situating a genetic disease that has
had a high political profile. Yet I do not adopt either perspective
here. Instead, I tell the story of the rise of the political control of

PKU without placing knowledge (its presence or its absence) in the
center, focusing rather on the labor involved in the collection,
The History of Newborn Phenylketonuria Screening in the U.S., in PROMOTING SAFE AND
EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
GENETIC TESTING 137 (Neil A. Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds., 1997) [hereinafter Paul,
History of Newborn PKU Screening]; see also Diane B. Paul, PKU Screening: Competing Agendas,
Converging Stories, in THE POLITICS OF HEREDITY: ESSAYS ON EUGENICS, BIOMEDICINE, AND
THE NATURE-NURTURE DEBATE 173 (Diane B. Paul ed., 1999); Diane B. Paul & Paul J. Edelson,
The Struggle over Metabolic Screening, in MOLECULARIZING BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE: NEW
PRACTICES AND ALLIANCES, 1910S-1970S, at 203 (Soraya de Chadarevian & Harmke Kamminga
eds., 1998). For other perspectives, see Samuel P. Bessman & Judith P. Swazey, Phenylketonuria:A
Study of Biomedical Legislation, in HUMAN ASPECTS OF BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION 49 (Everett
Mendelsohn et al. eds., 1971); Ruth R. Faden et al., Parental Rights, Child Welfare, and Public
Health: The Case of PKU Screening, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1396 (1982); Charles R. Scriver,
Whatever Happened to PKU?, 28 CLINICAL BIOCHEMISTRY 137 (1995).
4. See WILLARD R. CENTERWALL & SIEGFRIED A. CENTERWALL, U.S. CHILDREN'S
BUREAU, PUB. NO. 318, PHENYLKETONURIA: AN INHERITED METABOLIC DISORDER
ASSOCIATED WITH MENTAL RETARDATION (1965) (on file with the U.S. Children's Bureau,
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.); Scriver, supra note 3; see also
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. No. 419, supra note 1.
5. See COMMIT'EE FOR THE STUDY OF INBORN ERRORS OF METABOLISM, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETIC SCREENING: PROGRAMS, PRINCIPLES, AND RESEARCH (1975).
6. Id. at 93.
7. Id. at 92.
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analysis, and management of blood.
I suggest that blood directly brings the individual physically into
the network of testing and rationality that is central to contemporary
biomedicine. The management of babies' blood is a laboratory
replication of the social management of PKU. It is a controlled,
choreographed re-enactment of a larger political drama. More
broadly, I suggest that the systems of organization, manipulation, and
control that make human bodily materials (extracted tumors,
autopsied remains, and blood) effective or benevolent medical
resources also make manifest the relationships of these materials to
political power.
A large body of scholarly literature explores the political
meaning of scientific knowledge in relation to bodily difference,
pathology, race, illness, gender, and class. 8 Such studies emphasize
the roles of theory, culture, or ideology in scientific interpretations of
the body. I here suggest another approach. I attend to a laboratory
technique central to mandatory state testing of newborns and explore
the clinical protocols, practices, and interpretive uncertainties
surrounding a particular bodily material-namely, babies' blood. I
focus on the physical process of the management of newborns' blood
and propose that attending to such processes illuminates the many
layers of work involved in making PKU-and by inference genetic
disease in general-into a compelling public health problem. By
following the state's management of newborn blood, I draw links
between the physical and ideological labor that constructed this
genetic disease as a public priority.
I further suggest that this labor created a system into which other
diseases could be readily incorporated, though these diseases had to
share certain properties with PKU: genetic, metabolic, and present in
a newborn's blood. By the time the assumptions guiding the political
embrace of PKU came to be questioned in the mid-1960s, the system
of blood collection and analysis that PKU made possible persisted
unaffected, acquiring new properties, new advocates, new diseases,
and new purposes. 9
8. This is a fairly diverse literature. See, e.g., ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER:
BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN (1985); SANDER L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE
AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE, AND MADNESS (1985); SANDER L.
GILMAN, DISEASE AND REPRESENTATION: IMAGES OF ILLNESS FROM MADNESS TO AIDS (1988);
THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD (1990);
LONDA SCHIEBINGER, NATURE'S BODY: GENDER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN SCIENCE (1993).
9. For a useful exploration of the contemporary state of neonatal testing, see COMMITTEE ON
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My interest in such matters is a consequence of a reading of
Carolyn Bynum on ideas about material continuity and personal
survival in thirteenth and fourteenth century theological debates.
Bynum proposes that by considering the management of bodily
materials-by examining what contemporaries believed about where
and how relics should be handled-one could gain insight into larger
questions of the place and meaning of the body in Western thought.10
Her work provoked me to think about how fragmented bodies
acquire meaning and about the cultural context that makes a piece of
a human body a sacred object or a piece of data, to be stored in a
crystal reliquary or in a state-sanctioned laboratory, "preserved" and
immortal as a consequence of divine intervention or the long-term
storage of Guthrie cards.

I. THE BLOOD
PKU was identified as a familial disorder of phenylalanine
metabolism in 1934 by Asbjorn Folling, a physician whose family
included several children who had the disease. He was prodded by a
mother who wanted to understand her children's mental retardation
and their peculiar odor. Folling found that the children's urine turned
green upon the addition of ferric chloride and determined that this
color was a consequence of the presence of phenylpyruvic acid in the
urine. 1
British geneticist Lionel Penrose soon suggested that a diet low
in phenylalanine might be an effective therapy for PKU. This was
interpreted at the time as too expensive and impractical. 12 In 1951,
two British biochemists tested a controlled diet on three young
children-not newborns-and reported some improvement.13 By
1955, two other groups of researchers had tried low-phenylalanine
ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INSTITUTE OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
10. CAROLYN WALKER BYNUM, Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the

Resurrection of the Body: A Scholastic Discussion in Its Medieval and Modern Contexts, in
FRAGMENTATION AND REDEMPTION: ESSAYS ON GENDER AND THE HUMAN BODY IN
MEDIEVAL RELIGION 239 (1991).

11. Asbjorn Foiling, Phenylpyruvic Acid as a Metabolic Anomaly in Connection with
Imbecility, 8 NORD. MED. TIDSKR. 1054 (1934). A paper with the same title also appeared in a
German journal, see 227 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHYSIOLOGISCHE CHEMIE 169 (1934).
12. See Paul, History of Newborn PKU Screening, supra note 3, at 138. She notes that two
American biochemists also proposed treating affected infants with a low-phenylalanine diet. See id.
13. See L.I. Woolf & D.G. Vulliamy, Phenylketonuria with a Study of the Effect upon It of
Glutamic Acid, 26 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 487 (1951).
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diets in affected children with some reports of success. Horst Bickel,
a physician in England, reported that a three-year-old girl he was
treating stopped having convulsions. Bickel proposed that if the diet
had begun earlier mental retardation might have been avoided.14
The possibility of therapy and cure that this dietary intervention
promised was apparently intoxicating.
A patchwork of British
screening programs, using urine testing for phenylpyruvic acid, was in
place by 1959, though this screening resulted not from legislative
action but from local decisions by Public Health Department
officials.15 The testing was facilitated by the standard British practice
of home visits to young infants. Phenistix, the available urine test,
was most reliable when used with infants six to eight weeks of age,
and infants in Britain were routinely seen by a health professional in
their homes at about this age.1 6 In contrast, most newborns in the
United States left the hospital after two or three days-too early for
an effective urine test-and home visits were not a part of American
medical care. Therefore, in the United States a different bodily fluid
would better conform to existing medical practice.
Blood was to become the material sign of hidden metabolic
disease. It was the transferable, mobile, testable segment of a new
body that could be integrated into the American public health system.
It was the currency of the emerging field of public health genetics, the
commodity that health departments generated (by ordering its
removal from all newborns) just as they generated information and
clinical practices.
When Robert Guthrie and his laboratory assistant Ada Susi
developed a test that could detect the presence of excess
phenylalanine in a newborn's blood, they provided the technological
frame for a massive blood collection program. There was an
interaction between bodily fluids and health care delivery systems. A
blood test became central to the American system due not only to
Guthrie's ingenuity but also to the prevailing practices of infant care
in the United States. The test itself was modeled to meet an existing
space, and then in occupying that space it made possible other kinds
of tests that drew on the bodily fluid the test routinely produced.
14. Horst Bickel et al., Influence of Phenylalanine Intake on Phenylketonuria, 2 LANCET 812
(1953).
15. See James W. Farquhar et al., Problems of Routine Screening for Phenylketonuria, 2
LANCET 498 (1962), for a description of one such local screening program.
16. See id. at 498.
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Ultimately, the Guthrie test helped to create the legislative frame that
redefined PKU and eventually public health genetics.
Guthrie's full description of this test appeared in September 1963
17
in Pediatrics,'
though Guthrie had proposed the use of a similar
inhibition assay in the detection of metabolic disorders a year earlier
at a conference. 8 His new blood test was an indirect test that
calculated levels of phenylalanine based on bacterial growth under
specialized conditions. A strain of bacillus subtilis, a ubiquitous soil
bacteria not pathogenic to either animals or humans, was mixed with
an agent inhibitor that normally stopped its growth. To this mixture
was then added a punch-hole of the blood-soaked filter paper
collected from the newborn's heel. If the phenylalanine was present
in the blood, it would affect the ability of the inhibitor to stop the
bacterial growth. Thus, if the blood counteracted the inhibitor and
the bacteria grew, the test for phenylalanine was positive. The size of
the halo of bacterial growth was taken as a quantitative sign of the
level of phenylalanine. Technicians then interpreted the visual
phenomenon in numerical terms.
Although the procedure was not inherently difficult, at every
step it was possible to invalidate the test in some way-by timing the
test too early in the baby's life, inadequately soaking blood through
the filter paper, mislabeling a sample, failing to autoclave properly, or
misinterpreting the "semi-quantitative" results (the halo). Guthrie
himself emphasized the importance of the process of taking blood,
stressing that the blood should be applied "immediately to [the] ...
very absorbent filter paper."' 9 He also advised that the spot of blood
after air drying "should be at least 3/8 inch in diameter (but not more
than 1/2 inch) and close enough to the edge of the paper" so that a
disk could be easily punched out of it.20
Technicians and medical staff responsible for the test were
provided with instructions for obtaining blood specimens which told
'
them to set up a "well lighted work area" and to "wash hands. 21
17. Robert Guthrie & Ada Susi, A Simple Phenylalanine Method for Detecting
Phenylketonuria in Large Populations of Newborn Infants, 32 PEDIATRICS 338 (1963), reprinted in
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. No. 419, supra note 1, at 22.
18. R. Guthrie & H. Tieckelmann, The Inhibition Assay: Its Use in Screening Urinary
Specimens for Metabolic Differences Associated with Mental Retardation,in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
LONDON CONFERENCE ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY

43 (1962).

19. Guthrie & Susi, supra note 17, at 338.
20. Id.
21. Memorandum from William J. Peebles, M.D., Commissioner of Maryland Department of

1999]

BABIES' BLOOD

These instructions assumed that the parent would be present and
involved in the test, as evidenced by the suggestion that the parent
hold the infant "in [a] prone position on lap or table with heel or toe
lower than body."' 22 The technician then had to choose an "area for
puncture" -usually the heel-and "incise deeply enough to produce
free flow of blood. ' 23 Subsequently, the technician had to "hold [a]
Form BL50 with printed circles uppermost.., until each circle [was]
completely filled" with blood. 24 Guthrie noted that the paper was so
absorbent that "even very viscous blood from a young infant spreads
through the paper, so that the appearance of the blood spot is similar
on both sides of the paper." 5 In any case, these conditions had to be
met in order to obtain a uniform blood sample in the paper punch.
The test was choreographed-the infant's and mother's position
and the wound's proper bodily location specified. Every action of
those involved in this process, which violated the bodily integrity of
the newborn, was subject to standardization and technical control.
Guthrie constructed the process of extraction as a social drama
relevant to the state's interest in his test. Technicians needed to see
the explicit relationship between blood, properly distributed on the
filter paper, and the political legitimacy of the test.
Guthrie's emphasis on soaking the filter paper through
completely-so that when dried the circles of blood would appear the
same on the back and front-reflected persistent difficulties with this
task. In Maryland, an insufficient quantity of blood collected on filter
papers created a backlog of second tests early in the program. 26
"Reliable analysis" depended on filling the three-eighths inch circle
entirely and "repeated failure to do this" made repeat tests
necessary. 27 Furthermore, "[i]nvestigation of the reasons for this
problem, [showed] that it [occurred] most frequently where personnel

Health, to Local Health Officers, Maryland Department of Health, Obtaining Blood Specimen for
Blood Phenylalanine Test (Guthrie Test) (Mar. 13. 1968) (on file with Maryland Department of
Health, Baltimore, Md.).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Guthrie & Susie, supra note 17, at 338.
26. See Memorandum from William J. Peebles, M.D., Commissioner of Maryland Department
of Health, to Hospital Administrators, Maryland Department of Health, Progress Report No. 8:
Guthrie Screening Programfor PKU (Nov. 3, 1965) (on file with Maryland Department of Health,
Baltimore, Md.).
27. Id.
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in the newborn nursery [were] rotated or changed. 2 8 Thus, even at
this first step-at the point of extraction by a standardized
procedure-the workplace culture (rotation of personnel) interacted
with the intractability of the newborn body (its tendency to be
uncooperative, squirmy, and difficult) and the qualities of the blood
itself (extremely viscous) to shape the utility of the test.
In the next step, the control of mechanical things (autoclaves and
paper disks) replaced the control of social interaction (technician,
infant, and mother). The spots of blood on the Guthrie cards were
numbered with a pencil, and the cards were placed on pieces of metal
screening or wire test tube racks to be autoclaved (heated) at fifteen
pounds pressure for three minutes with dry steam. 29 This prevented
blood pigments from later diffusing from the paper disks into the agar
during incubation, a diffusion which tended to mask possible growth
zones.
Prolonged autoclaving, however, would destroy the
phenylalanine. A one-fourth inch in diameter disk then was punched
from the center of the blood spot, and the disks placed in rows on a
clean piece of paper in the same sequence that they were placed on
30
the agar for assay.
These paper disks were processed, yet unread, signs of invisible
disease and the presence of the disease could be obscured by the
blood itself; blood diffusing into the agar; autoclaving, if carried out
too long; or mislabeling, resulting in allocation of the blood to the
incorrect body. Moreover, a 1963 survey suggested that the most
difficult step for many technicians was the quantitative interpretation
of the halo of bacterial growth. 31 Thus, newborn blood was not a
transparent sign of a disease or a direct guide to state control, but a
sign mediated by the labor of technicians who varied in their
laboratory skills.
The Guthrie test made PKU a disorder that could be completely
present in the newborn infant. Formerly diagnosable in the toddler

28. Id.
29. See Guthrie & Susi, supra note 17, at 338.
30. See id.
31. See Gladys Krueger, Remarks at the Division of Health Services Staff Meeting, Assessment
of Performanceof LaboratoriesParticipatingin a Trialof PhenylalanineScreening Method (June 6,
1963) (transcript available at the U.S. Children's Bureau, National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, Md.). This survey, conducted by the U.S. Children's Bureau which
managed the initial field trials of the Guthrie test in the United States, found that laboratories varied
in their skill levels and that the test seemed to be particularly prone to false negatives, a type of error
that could undermine its value as a screening tool. See id.
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through a suite of symptoms or in the eight-week-old infant with a
urine test, the disease came to potentially exist in the body of the
newborn as early as seventy-two hours after birth with the Guthrie
test. The timing of diagnosis of any disease is always important, but
in the case of genetic disease timing is particularly dramatic. For
example, the technologies that make it possible to identify
Huntington Disease in a fetus change the meaning of the disease for
everyone involved. PKU was an early case in which a genetic disease
could be made present-not in this case through DNA testing, but
through biochemical manipulation of blood-before it was a clinical
syndrome.
This test also indirectly led to a definition of PKU as a racial
disease-a disease of the blood in the traditional sense. It was not
that those involved believed that African-American babies could not
have PKU, but rather that including African-American babies in the
initial field trials would make the test appear less cost-effective as a
public health screening tool. This need to legitimate the blood test as
an appropriate guide to state intervention provoked a particular way
32
of thinking about PKU.
II. A RACIAL DISEASE
When Guthrie proposed the field trial to the Children's Bureau
on May 2, 1962, he simply stated, "It is suggested also that nonwhite
infants should not be included in this study. '33 This was one of the
limitations on the study. Other limitations included a suggestion that
the trial take place only in hospitals in which "blood specimens can be
collected as late as the third or fourth day of life." 4 A few weeks
later the Children's Bureau sent out a letter to states invited to
participate in the field trial. Among the "points [which] should be
read carefully" was the following:
32. Penrose had earlier suggested that the disease had a racial component, though with a very
different intent. In his 1946 paper in The Lancet, he emphasized its apparent absence in Jews in an
effort to make an antiracist point about racial groups and their susceptibility to disease. See L.S.
Penrose, Phenylketonuria: A Problem in Eugenics, 1 LANCET 949 (1946). I am grateful to Diane
Paul for pointing out this reference to me. On more general questions of race and disease, see
KEITH WAILOO, DRAWING

BLOOD: TECHNOLOGY

AND DISEASE IDENTITY IN TWENTIETH-

CENTURY AMERICA (1997).

33. Robert Guthrie, Phenylketonuria Detection in the Young Infant as a Routine Hospital
Procedure, A Trial of a Phenylalanine Screening Method in 400,000 Infants (proposal submitted to
the U.S. Children's Bureau, May 2, 1962), reprintedin CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. NO. 419, supra
note 1, at 31.
34. Id.
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The plan provides that the infant population used for this initial

trial should consist of white infants who are three or four days of
age (because phenylketonuria is virtually non-existent in non-white
groups and because of our lack of knowledge as to what

phenylalanine levels are in the first four days). Hospitals selected,
therefore, should be chiefly those who serve white infants and
who
35
discharge such newborn infants only after three or four days.

Two sorts of ignorance therefore shaped this initial field trial:
ignorance about the disease's racial distribution and ignorance about
its manifestation in the first seventy-two hours of life. But the
category "nonwhite" was much more ambiguous than the category
"infants at least three or four days old," as one regional medical
director pointed out.
Lucille J. Marsh, a physician in charge of the Children's Bureau
office in Chicago, questioned the decision to exclude nonwhite
infants. "This seems to me a mistake," she said, "even though cases
are rarely found in non-white infants according to our present
knowledge. ' 36 She regarded "some information as to the screening
results among non-white infants" as valuable.37 She also suggested
that there was "presently so much confusion as to the percentage of
white or non-white blood in many population groups as, for example,
in the large Negro population, the Porto [sic] Ricans, the Mexicans,
etc., that the division into white and non-white will probably be
purely arbitrary in the next generation."3 8 The impurities of blood in
the American melting pot, her argument proposed, negated its
potential role as a border between productive and nonproductive
bodies.
35. Memorandum from John M. Saunders, M.D., Acting Regional Medical Director, U.S.
Children's Bureau, to State Department of Health, Study of Phenylketonuria(May 31, 1962) (on file
with the U.S. Children's Bureau, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park,
Md.). Other points included that the state's health department should advise Guthrie of the number
of babies they expected to screen, and Guthrie would then send the required number of test kits to
state health departments. See id. Furthermore, a two-week urine follow-up was crucial both to
catch missed cases and to assess the Guthrie test:
The two-week follow-up urine phenylalanine (not phenyketone) test has not been
emphasized, but is of critical importance. This test should (a) find all cases of PKU,
and (b) serve to evaluate the efficiency of the first blood phenylalanine test done on
specimens taken as late as possible when the infant is in the hospital nursery.
Id.
36. Memorandum from Lucille J. Marsh, M.D., to Rudolf P. Hormuth, Specialist in Services
for Mentally Retarded Children, U.S. Children's Bureau, Plan Material For Trial of Phenylalanine
Screen Method in 400,000 Infants (June 1, 1962) (on file with the U.S. Children's Bureau, National
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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A staff member at the Children's Bureau responded with the
argument that nonwhite infants would skew the sample. The Bureau
was concerned about "getting an adequate sample of white infants
where the expected incidence is approximately 1 in 20,000." 9
Because there was only one reported case of PKU in a nonwhite
infant, the Bureau feared that "over half of the infants included might
be nonwhite and this.., could lead to the mistaken conclusion that
this assay is not effective as a screening tool. ' 40 Therefore, the
exclusion of nonwhites was necessary in order "to give the assay a fair
'4
trial with a group where at least we have a vague idea of incidence. 1
The efficient management of the Guthrie test called for
restricting its use to a racial and political category-an infant body
(white) marked as productive. The blood of nonwhite infants was a
public resource irrelevant to the Children's Bureau's promotion of
the Guthrie test. So when a Civil Rights Commission official learned
of the policy and complained, the Children's Bureau staff framed the
4
exclusion as efficient resource management.
By constructing their screening trial around a population they
believed to be at higher risk for the condition and thereby excluding
39. Letter from Rudolf P. Hormuth, Specialist in Services for Mentally Retarded Children,
U.S. Children's Bureau, to Lucille J. Marsh, M.D. (June 6, 1962) (on file with the U.S. Children's
Bureau, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.).
Hormuth
acknowledged that there might be some cases of PKU among the nonwhite population but stated
that so far "existing screening and diagnostic methods have not turned up many cases." Id. In
response to the suggestion that nonwhite infants might have elevated blood phenylalanine without
having PKU, Hormuth commented that the Children's Bureau would be "interested in exploring"
the question, but only as a separate project-not as a part of the initial screening trial of 400,000
infants to assess the Guthrie test. See id. If "some states are interested in exploring phenylalanine
levels in nonwhite infants (in addition to doing their share of white infants for the field trial)," he
indicated the possibility of arranging this with Guthrie, who distributed the test kits. Id. He advised
that it would be important, however, to "keep these figures separately. Urine screening of negro
infants in well baby clinics thus far has not been productive." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The complaint came in April 1963 when Mrs. Martin of the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights telephoned to ask if the PKU program was sponsored by the Children's Bureau and if
the government was contributing funding. The Commission had a complaint from Springfield,
Massachusetts, stating that nonwhite children were not being included in this program. In
practice in participating hospitals, Massachusetts was apparently screening all infants-white
and nonwhite-and was about to approve legislation requiring that all newborns be screened in
all hospitals. Hormuth responded that the case that Martin referred to in Springfield,
Massachusetts, was probably unrelated to the Children's Bureau program as it did not involve a
newborn. See Memorandum from Rudolph P. Hormuth, Specialist in Services for Mentally
Retarded Children, U.S. Children's Bureau, to Ruby G. Martin, Staff Attorney, U.S. Civil
Rights Commission, Exclusion of Non-white Children from PKU Screening Program
(Springfield, Massachusetts) (Apr. 11, 1963) (on file with the U.S. Children's Bureau, National
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.).
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nonwhite infants, Guthrie and the Children's Bureau staff constructed
PKU as a racial disease. They amalgamated categories-"white"
versus "nonwhite" babies-in ways that reflected their institutional
concerns over justifying the Guthrie test as a mass screening
technology. My point is not that the exclusion of "nonwhite infants"
was malicious. In the context of this field trial, the decision to
construct PKU in racial terms made sense. But the case does
demonstrate how particular ways of managing bodily materials-in
this case a test of phenylalanine in newborns' blood-can provoke
limited ways of thinking about a disease and limited ways of making
public policy.
Marsh was right to point out that rates of PKU in nonwhite
populations were unknown. Under these conditions, a "fair trial" of
the testing technology depended on an interpretation of PKU in
racial terms. The institutional and political priorities were bundled
into the testing technology, foreclosing some questions while
apparently answering others. As a white disease, PKU drew on
readily applicable social categories ("white" and "nonwhite"), widely
recognized and extremely important to the organization of health
care and public health in the United States.

III. REDEMPTION
By September 1964, the Children's Bureau was urging the use of
the Guthrie blood test on a routine basis for all infants. The
inhibition assay method now made it practical, said a Bureau press
release, "to carry out routine screening of newborn infants in
hospitals for detection of this inborn error of metabolism."' 43 In the
field trials, blood was extracted from more than 400,000 newborns at
505 hospitals. Thirty-nine cases of disease-visible in the blood-had
been detected out of only 275 "presumptive positives" subjected to
further testing.44 The frequency of PKU in this specially screened
population, thus, was 1 in 10,347-higher than predicted when the
45
trials began.
As the Guthrie test was rapidly embedded in state law,

43. Press Release from the U.S. Children's Bureau, PKU Blood Screening in Hospitals (Sept.
30, 1964) (on file with the U.S. Children's Bureau, National Archives and Records Administration,
College Park, Md.).
44. See id.
45. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. No. 419, supra note 1, at 10.
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legislation was justified in public discussions by a narrative of
redemption: a claim that mandatory political control of PKU,
mediated by the blood taken from new citizens, was a benevolent
state intervention that saved PKU children from their own
metabolism. With a proper system to manage blood, the state could
redeem the vulnerable body by providing information. In turn, the
blood of newborns could redeem both society and the individual
marked with a metabolic disorder.
The redemption narrative was the one detail that was
consistently included in materials given to new mothers and
consistently invoked by legislators. It was the only biological fact in
these contexts that mattered. Mothers were not told that PKU was a
disorder of phenylalanine metabolism, that it was inherited as an
autosomal recessive, or that it could be detected by an inhibition
assay in which excess phenylalanine permitted bacterial growth. But
they were told that it could be treated with a "special diet."
A Minnesota brochure, for example, emphasized that PKU
damage could be prevented through a "special diet," while another
brochure said that advocates for mentally retarded children "know
that the best way of doing something about mental retardation is to
prevent it from happening. '' 46 A pamphlet used in Findlay, Ohio,
included lurid title lettering asking new mothers, "How will your
child's mind develop?" The text itself emphasized the efficacy of the
controlled diet. 47 And a Massachusetts leaflet given to parents
presented the redemption narrative in classic form, telling parents
that research has shown that "this mental retardation may be
prevented if a special modified milk diet is started during the first few
weeks of life .... [I]t is very important to find it early so that the
'48
special diet can be started before it is too late to be effective.
The omission of details about the disease reflected the fact that
redemption alone could justify the mass screening program. Mothers
needed to know that salvation was possible, but they did not
particularly need to know how the Guthrie test worked. In fact, other
biological details were deemed irrelevant. The brochures they
46. Letter from Rudolph P. Hormuth, Specialist in Services for Mentally Retarded Children,
U.S. Children's Bureau, to William Swatek, M.D. (Oct. 2, 1962) (copy of brochure from Fergus
Falls, Minnesota, included with letter) (on file with the U.S. Children's Bureau, National Archives
and Records Administration, College Park, Md.).
47. See id. (copy of pamphlet from Findlay, Ohio, included with letter).
48. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. No. 419, supra note 1, at 66.
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received presented the disease in ways that could and did explain and
justify the removal of blood from their babies' heels. Meanwhile, just
as the legislative mandates began to accumulate-with more and
more states passing PKU legislation and accepting the idea of
mandatory screening-the Children's Bureau began to have doubts
about the enterprise it had sponsored and promoted.
IV. PUBLIC DOUBTS
Some significant problems emerged including ambiguous test
results, problems with the maintenance of the diet, confusion about
the disease itself, and doubts about the effect of diet on intelligence
and psychosocial development. "A critical and objective review of
the experience of the past fifteen years now indicates that the
problem may not be as simple as was originally thought," wrote John
A. Anderson and Kenneth F. Swaiman in a brief note introducing
conference proceedings in 1966. 49 The disease itself was a more
diverse entity than originally believed, as reflected by the comment
that "the spectrum of the basic and clinical aspects of the disease is
wide."50
Some children whose blood contained high phenylalanine levels
were being "confused with children who have classical
phenylketonuria."' In addition, some children who did seem to have
"classical phenylketonuria" (whatever that might be) developed
normally even without a restrictive diet. Anderson and Swaiman
noted that "[t]he results of more thorough studies on family
constellations suggest that the number of these mild or untreated
cases may be a far greater segment of the clinical spectrum of the
disease. 5' 2 Therefore, it was now absolutely critical, they urged, to
"redefine not only the basic variations in the primary enzymatic
defect, but also.., to clarify the significance of the biochemical
53
screening procedures now so widely employed.
It had also become "essential to define more clearly the
49. See John A. Anderson & Kenneth F. Swaiman, Introduction to PHENYLKETONURIA AND
DISEASES (John A. Anderson & Kenneth F. Swaiman eds., 1967)
(proceedings of the Conference on Phenylketonuria and Allied Metabolic Diseases which was held
in Washington, D.C., on April 6-8, 1966).
ALLIED METABOLIC

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.

1999]

BABIES' BLOOD

diagnostic criteria for the disease 5 4 for it was now "common clinical
knowledge" that variations occurred among PKU patients, for
example, in fasting blood phenylalanine levels, the utilization of
phenylalanine, and tolerance levels.55
Furthermore, the "sharp
dichotomy" between carriers who did not manifest the disease and
'5 6
those with actual PKU was now "doubtful at the chemical level.
The genetic dichotomy-heterozygote/homozygote-did not translate
into a chemical dichotomy, and the chemical dichotomy did not
translate neatly into a clinical dichotomy in patient outcomes. Some
patients with "classical PKU" did not suffer from developmental
deficits even without the diet. And some patients had high blood
phenylalanine for a different chemical reason-"lack of transaminase
activity"-and therefore did not have PKU but a "new condition.",,
Moreover, "'occult' phenylketonurics" had been discovered in
the British screening program-patients who had PKU but whose
excretion of phenylpyruvic acid in urine was too low to give a positive
reaction in the Phenistix test (the urine test used in the British
screening program).8 Additionally, at least one set of apparently
identical twins, both testing positive for PKU, had been studied in
which one twin was of normal intelligence and the other severely
retarded. L.I. Woolf, a physician presenting at the 1966 conference,
concluded that "[t]he difference in clinical manifestations cannot be
genetic in origin if [these twins] are monozygotic."5 9
It was also becoming clear that the blood test was picking up
genetically "healthy" infants who did not "have" the genetic disease
PKU but nonetheless were born with symptoms of PKU, including
high phenylalanine blood levels and mental retardation because of
maternal PKU. A December 1963 issue of the New England Journal
of Medicine described three women whose high blood phenylalanine
levels apparently produced mental retardation in all fourteen children
born to them. These children did not have genetic PKU, but their
bodily condition mimicked PKU-it was produced by the same
biochemical processes and detected by the same tests. What disease
54. Id.
55. See George A. Jervis, Overall View of Our Biochemical Knowledge of Phenylketonuria, in
PHENYLKETONURIA AND ALLIED METABOLIC DISEASES, supra note 49, at 32,32.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 33.
58. See L.I. Woolf, Large-Scale Screening for Metabolic Disease in the Newborn in Great
Britain,in PHENYLKETONURIA AND ALLIED METABOLIC DISEASES, supra note 49, at 50, 51.

59. Id. at 58.
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exactly did these babies suffer from? And who was being tested when
the newborn's blood was taken? Guthrie noted that "[t]his is the first
published evidence that phenylketonuria in the mother may be a
significant cause of mental retardation in the offspring, due to the
damaging effect to the foetus before birth caused by the mother's
high phenylalanine blood level." 6
PKU, the disease itself, as an intellectual and clinical category,
was being called into question as a consequence of the details
produced by a widespread system of disease management. What
exactly was PKU? How could it be identified? Perhaps the screening
program was defining the bodily condition inappropriately, perhaps
even in ways that could damage children. 61 Anderson and Swaiman
advised: "In the face of conflicting evidence it is now imperative that
'6
all aspects of the problem be reviewed.
The ensuing conference included papers on primary metabolic
questions, dietary management, and the "role of government and
legislation in [the] management of problems in medicine." 63 PKU was
defined in these different contexts as an enzymatic defect with some
impact on the central nervous system, a public health problem, a
consequence of patient refusal of an unpalatable diet, a psychological
problem, and a test of screening technologies and methods that could
guide future screening programs for other diseases.
Toward the close of the conference, Howard University political
scientist Joseph D. Cooper voiced some general criticisms of the PKU
program, suggesting that the screening so rapidly adopted by so many
states constituted an inappropriate use of state power based on
inadequate scientific evidence. Cooper commented, "[M]andatory
legislation has been chosen as the medium for achieving program
acceptance without regard to sensitive questions which concern the
future practice of medicine." 64 But Guthrie quickly challenged
Cooper's right to criticize scientists, remarking, "I don't think it is
possible for you as a political scientist to discuss the scientific
60. Memorandum from Robert Guthrie, University of Buffalo Medical School, to Maternal
and child heath directors and laboratory directors participating in the trial of the inhibition assay for
early detection of phenylketonuria, Detection of MaternalPhenylketonuria (Jan. 8, 1964), reprinted
in CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. No. 419, supra note 1, at 60-61.
61. See Anderson & Swaiman, supra note 49.
62. Id.
63. Id. (table of contents).
64. Joseph D. Cooper, The Role of Government and Legislation in Management of Problems in
Medicine, in PHENYLKETONURIA AND ALLIED METABOLIC DISEASES, supra note 49, at 168,168.
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evidence .... ,,65 In contrast, Guthrie presented himself as a deeply
interested and invested scientist who developed and promoted the
blood test "as a parent of a retarded child, and as the uncle of a
phenylketonuric child. My niece, who is now eight years old, gave me
impetus to develop the screening test. ' 66 Cooper's disciplinary
distance, Guthrie suggested, prohibited him from speaking to
scientific questions, while Guthrie's own bodily, emotional, and
personal investment in PKU (his familial experience) was central to
his legitimacy as a spokesman for PKU screening.
Guthrie then defended mandatory screening by pointing out that
"the laws compel the collection of a specimen. The details concerning
Thus,
the specimen are left up to the State health department ...
the blood itself was the focus of the legislation. The state legislature
could demand that the blood be removed from the body-it could
pass laws that would "compel the collection of a specimen" - but its
post-embodied fate depended on a different realm of expertise, that
to be found in state health departments and scientific laboratories.
Guthrie's defense of the PKU screening program postulated that the
blood of newborns was the material that could move across and link
the political and the scientific.
",61

CONCLUSION

In 1970, after PKU screening programs were virtually universal
in the United States and in many European nations, the American
Society of Human Genetics' Committee for Social and Public Issues
in Human Genetics began a study of "problems of large-scale
screening for genetic metabolic disorders. '68 A "full scale evaluation
of existing practices of the phenylketonuria program" was needed,
with attention to "medical, scientific, logistic, administrative and
' 69
economic aspects.
65. Id. at 174.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 175.
68. Letter from Arno Motulsky, Chair of the Committee for Social and Public Issues in
Human Genetics, American Society of Human Genetics, to Philip Handler, President of the
National Academy of Sciences (Mar. 6, 1970) (on file with the Archives of the National Academy of
Sciences, Washington, D.C.). The distinguished members of the committee included three luminous
figures in postwar genetics: James V. Neel at the University of Michigan, James F. Crow at the
University of Wisconsin, and Joshua Lederberg at Stanford University. Other members included
Alexander Beam of the Cornell Medical Center, Barton Childs of the Department of Pediatrics at
Johns Hopkins University, and Robert F. Murray at the Howard University College of Medicine.
69. Id.
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The final report, published in 1975, was an effort to come to
terms with the emerging consequences of state-mandated blood
testing and newborn screening. 0 The committee was interested in the
possibility of "storing biological specimens for later testing,"'" and the
blood taken from infants was constructed as a permanent public
resource that could be archived for some unknown future use,
72
including future testing as new diagnostic techniques developed.
The Study of Inborn Errors of Metabolism-SIEM as it came to be
identified -concluded that genetic disease had become a public
health problem of national significance.
The blood extracted from almost every newborn in the United
States for the last thirty-two years is a physical monument of the rise
of genetic disease to medical prominence. Stored indefinitely in state
laboratories, the babies' blood is an archive in which a particular
construction of the body is preserved. The blood itself is a record not
only in the sense that it records data about individuals, but also in the
sense that its systematic management makes manifest some central
properties of the biomedical and political construction of the body:
fragmented for the purposes of obtaining information, the body
moves into an information retrieval system and becomes a form of
transportable data.
As a subject of state-mandated testing programs, the blood saves
the public money, but the state's financial interests in the able body
are not the only justifications for PKU testing programs. The blood is
also a sign of faith that through testing redemption can be achievedthe sick can be healed, the mind restored. The child with PKU can be
prevented from experiencing the degraded state of mental retardation
as a consequence of the blood itself, which makes state intervention
possible by providing the information needed to justify action.
As problems emerged with the twin technological parameters
that shaped PKU-testing and diet-issues that seemed to have been
resolved unraveled. The diet was neither as simple nor as effective as
70. See id. Motulsky said the group's goal was to "identify public issues in genetics and in
various ways to foster discussion and public understanding in these areas." Id. He seemed to
suggest that the purpose of studying PKU screening was to guide "future action in this field." Id
But he closed his letter of appeal to Handler by saying that the "screening problem" (not further
elaborated) "is only one of many public issues in human genetics which need broad and more
intensive attention." Id. The PKU study could produce, he hoped, "solid recommendations for
action" and this "first venture" might provide "a mode of approach" that could be applied to other
issues. Id.
71. Id.
72. See COMMITEE FOR THE STUDY OF INBORN ERRORS OF METABOLISM, supra note 5.
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early reports had suggested, and the test neither as reliable nor as
unequivocal. Yet the institutions grounded in these technologies
persisted and became the framework for other genetic tests.
"Certainty" about both test and therapy disappeared, but the
legislative frame built from that certainty persisted unaffected and
could be adapted to other uses.
Presently, newborns in North America, Europe, Australia, and
Japan are routinely screened for about a dozen metabolic disorders,
not all of them treatable. The network of blood-spotted filter paper
that this screening produces around the world has become a resource
for researchers in academe and private industry, in a process one
ethicist has called the "highjacking of legitimate newborn screening
by researchers looking for easy specimens from the captive
population of newborns."7 3 A physician at a French diagnostic center
noted in 1993 that "for over twenty years, examinations were carried
out on blood samples that were destined for entirely different uses,"
but that these "alternative" uses of blood were now coming under
increasing scrutiny. 14 He asked: "Do we have the right to conserve
the blood, serum or DNA of an individual without their knowing
what will be done with it?""7
Other selected populations are screened for different reasonsperhaps because they are at a high risk for a particular disease (TaySachs) or because they are in an age group in which chromosomal
defects are likely. While such screening poses similar questions of
privacy and consent, it does not involve the blanket screening of
every newborn or the violation of a body (one critic has called it
"technically an assault"76) that cannot provide informed consent.
Neonatal screening is a particularly powerful and revealing network
of political and biological control, and PKU remains its flagship
disease.
A poorly understood and defined disease entity with highly
variable expression and a difficult treatment therapy became in the
73. Bartha Maria Knoppers, Newborn Screening and Informed Consent, in NEW HORIZONS IN
NEONATAL SCREENING 15, 19 (Jean-Pierre Farriaux & Jean-Louis Dhondt eds., 1994) (proceedings
of the Ninth International Neonatal Screening Symposium and the Second Meeting of the
International Society for Neonatal Screening which were held in Lille, France, on September 13-17,
1993).
74. Jean-Franqois Mattei, Ethical and Legal Issues Associated with the Conservation of Blood
Samples, in NEW HORIZONS INNEONATAL SCREENING, supranote 73, at 41.41.
75. Id.
76. Knoppers, supra note 73, at 18.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:113

1960s and 1970s a political symbol of the potential power of applied
human genetics. A genetic disease with plasticity, amenable to
environmental control, presented the prospect of effective
intervention with such force that it became unethical to question the
test or the intervention, and certainly unethical to withhold them,
even if many questions remained.
Through an institutional,
technological and social network, some uncertainties and questions
about PKU disappeared because they ceased to be asked or to be
open to being asked. Other uncertainties emerged as difficulties with
the performance of the Guthrie test and the management of the lowphenylalanine diet became clear. The disease -PKU-came to
conform to the available technologies and to the legislative mandates
that defined its relevant properties.
How, then, was PKU made? It was made by technologies that
foreclosed options-the Guthrie test; by state laws that mandated a
particular clinical interaction; and by a redemption narrative that
drove such legislation and that justified faith in both science and
political control. The meaning of the fact that any particular body
was unable to catalyze phenylalanine to tyrosine depended on a
system of laboratory technology and legislative support. There was in
this case no sharp line between the bodily experience of disease, the
blood with high levels of phenylalanine, and the public health and
laboratory systems that managed and made sense of both body and
blood. It is not possible to extract PKU from the technologies that
reveal it-the technician who autoclaves a Guthrie card is
participating in making PKU, as are the laws that mandate tests for its
presence and the manufacturers who produce the dietary supplement
Lofenalac for PKU patients.
As the PKU case suggests, biological materials drawn from
human beings, whether living or dead, are political commodities. The
babies' blood collected for PKU testing was treated in the ways many
bodily materials in twentieth century biomedicine are routinely
treated. The systems I explore are present in everyday biomedical
testing of bodily fluids in a standard physical; in the institutional
testing of inmates, employees, students, or military recruits; in
epidemiological and biomedical research; and in the corporate,
proprietary management of cell lines, tissue samples, DNA probes,
and other fragments.7 Acquiring such materials generally involves
77. For an insightful exploration of these kinds of testing, see DOROTHY NELKIN &
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political and social negotiation. This is obvious to those interested in
obtaining DNA from isolated populations needed for the Human
Genome Diversity Project, malformed stillbirths from mothers at
Chernobyl, spinal fluid from African-American men at Tuskegee,
blood from newborns to be tested for AIDS, or the brains of serial
killers to be assessed for pathologies. 8 Such materials contain
reliable knowledge only when they have been shepherded through a
process of extraction, testing, and preservation.
More generally, I seek to understand through what processes
genetic disease acquired the properties it possesses today-as both
proximate and ultimate cause of all disease and as a public health
problem on a grand scale. The PKU case helps to make visible the
piecemeal nature of this transformation. It is of particular interest as
the data produced by the Human Genome Project continues to
expand the range of genetic testing. The steady stream of new disease
genes can quickly be accessed as textual signs of risk and future
pathology. The ability to test asymptomatic children for late-onset
disease has been the focus of particularly intense concern among
ethicists and health professionals. 79 As the PKU case suggests,
technologies close options as well as open them, and can and do
prevent inquiry as surely as they encourage it. As we embrace genetic
testing and a model of all diseases as genetic-as genetic disease
emerges as the central public health problem of the twenty-first
century-it is perhaps useful to pause and consider how we make
decisions about the presence or absence of genetic disease, and how
genetic disease has conformed to available networks of technology
and social management.
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